The most general type of multi-party computation involves n participants. Participant
Introduction
It is now widely appreciated that quantum information has advantages over classical information in carrying out several computational and cryptographic tasks, but as yet we have no general understanding of its power. Until very recently, quantum key distribution was the only significant cryptographic task known to be guaranteed secure by quantum theory. The work of Lo and Chau [1, 2, 3] and Mayers [4, 5, 6] suggested that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment was impossible and that other cryptographic applications of quantum information might be relatively limited or even non-existent. However, their no-go theorems have loopholes: unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocols do exist. [7] One of the most interesting general problems in cryptography, classical or quantum, is the problem of carrying out multi-party computations of various types while keeping the data supplied by the participants as private as possible. The most general type of multi-party computation involves n participants. Participant P i supplies private data x i and obtains an output function f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The computation protocol is said to be unconditionally secure if each participant can verify, with probability arbitrarily close to one, that every other participant obtains arbitrarily little information about the data beyond what is implied by their agreed outputs f i and their own data x i .
Lo has argued that unconditional security is impossible for all one-sided two-party computations and for many two-sided two-party computations. [3] But there is a loophole in this no-go theorem too: it ignores the possibility that one or more of the parties can use measurements carried out during the protocol to decide whether or not to continue. We give here a general proof that all multi-party computations can be implemented in a way which is unconditionally secure if they are carried out on a quantum computer.
Multi-party computation
The basic principles of quantum computing are well understood. A general quantum computation can be carried out by taking a series of qubits -states in a two-dimensional Hilbert space -as input, allowing them to evolve and interact through a series of oneor two-qubit gates, and reading out the answer from a series of output qubits. Any computation that can be carried out on a classical computer can also be carried out on a quantum computer. In particular, any collection of n computable integer functions f i of n integers x i lying in known finite ranges can in principle be calculated on a quantum computer as follows.
Define a reference basis {|0 , |1 } for each input and output qubit. Write the x i in binary form, and encode them in this basis in input registers containing sufficiently many qubits to accommodate any x i within the known ranges. Add further input qubits in the state |0 -the number required will depend on the calculation and the ranges of the x i .
Evolve the input through a series of gates designed to carry out the calculation, so that the functions f i appear in the same binary code in a series of output registers, whose size can be bounded once the ranges of the x i are known. Carry out measurements on these registers, in the measurement basis {|0 , |1 }, in order to read off the output. The f i and x i can be positive or negative integers: the sign of the input and output registers can be defined using one extra qubit in the obvious way.
This suggests the following strategy for multi-party computations. Clare, a trusted independent operator, agrees to set up a quantum computer to carry out the calculation.
She gives each of the parties access to one of the input registers, so that they can input their private data, and access to the relevant output register, so that they can read off their function at the end of the calculation. She sets the remaining input bits to |0 , starts the calculation once everyone has input their data, and lets them know when the calculation is complete so that they can read their output.
But this is too naive. If all the parties could trust Clare completely, there would be no need to use either quantum information or any form of cryptography. On the other hand, the protocol completely relies on Clare's trustworthiness: she can, without fear of detection, carry out measurements on the input qubits in the |0 , |1 basis before running the computation, on the output qubits in the same basis before handing them over, or on intermediate data in suitable bases during the calculation.
Even if Clare could somehow be prevented from carrying out any of these measurements, there is another security concern. Since a quantum state is being evolved coherently throughout the calculation, the number of output qubits must equal the number of input qubits, and in general the output states will include some "junk" qubits as well as the output registers. In general, the junk qubits will contain useful information about the f i and the x i -information which must somehow be erased for a secure computation.
Secure multi-party computation
To solve these security problems, the parties carry out variants of the calculation a large number of times, using the following protocol. Postive numbers p and q close to one are agreed among the parties, in each case by choosing the highest values less than one that any of them proposes. Each time the calculation is carried out, each party inputs a random string of |0 and |1 qubits into their input register. With probability p, each party P i then carries out a random rotation on their input register, choosing a unitary operation from U (2 m i ), where m i is the number of qubits in the i-th input register. Clare sets the remaining input qubits to |0 .
All random choices in the protocol are made independently by each participant for each calculation, and all the random choices made are bit committed by the relevant party to all the other participants, using a secure quantum bit commitment protocol. [7] In these commitments the input states are described precisely as binary strings. The random rotations are described to a degree of precision previously agreed by the parties, by choosing the greatest degree of precision that any of them requires. The parties also separately commit a bit to say whether or not they have carried out a random rotation on their inputs, so that they can reveal this fact without revealing anything about the rotation.
All the input registers are then given to Clare. She now runs the resulting state through a series of gates she has set up to carry out the multi-party computation. She has previously described the precise circuit she will use to all of the parties, so that they can check that it will indeed carry out the required computation given valid numerical inputs, and so that they can calculate the full output state from any input state.
Clare hands the states in each of the output registers and the junk qubit register to Hilbert spaces corresponding to the N output registers and the junk register. He then passes these states unmeasured to P 2 .
For each of the approximately (1−p)N outputs passed to him, P 2 now reveals whether or not he carried out a rotation on his input. If he did, then he asks everyone else to reveal their input states and random rotations on the inputs, and he asks P 1 to reveal the random rotations he has just carried out on the outputs. He tests that the output is consistent with these claims and with Clare's circuit. If he did not, he in turn carries out and bit commits random rotations on each of the (N + 1) Hilbert spaces and passes the states unmeasured to P 3 . P 3 now follows a similar procedure on the approximately (1 − p) 2 N states passed to him, and so on. Each participant has ensured that p is large enough that, if the data pass their statistical tests in this phase of the protocol, they will be confident enough that no one is illicitly extracting any significant amount of information to be willing to go through with the rest of the protocol.
The protocol proceeds until either one of the parties detects cheating, in which case the protocol ends, or until the output has passed all of their tests. Suppose that no cheating is detected. P n then has approximately (1 − p) n N output states of computations for which no one's inputs were rotated, on which no tests have so far been carried out, but which he and all the other participants have rotated randomly. For each of these outputs, he
gives the i-th register state to P i . The junk registers of these outputs play no further role and can be thrown away: the participants will not reveal the random rotations applied to them, so that they carry no information useful to anyone.
The first (n − 1) participants now need to test that P n has indeed given them back the i-th register states of the calculation outputs, rather than substituting some other states at this point. To ensure this, each of the P i , for i from 1 to (n − 1), in turn nominates some large fraction q of the remaining calculations, asks everyone to reveal all their bit commitments for the calculation, and verifies that his output register is indeed in the right state. Again, they have previously chosen q sufficiently large to be statistically confident enough to be willing to complete the protocol if the data pass these tests.
The participants then go through the list of remaining computations one by one. Any P i whose random input data for any given computation does not equal the correct value x i announces the fact, without revealing the random rotations he carried out on the output data. That computation is then ignored. Once the participants find a computation for which each of them supplied the correct input x i , they all reveal their bit committed rotations on each other's output registers (but not the rotations they carried out on their own register or the junk register). Each participant then reverses the rotations that were carried out on his own output register, and carries out measurements on the register qubits in the |0 , |1 basis to read his output, statistically confident that it will indeed be the function f i .
Approximately (1 − p) n (1 − q) n−1 N calculations survive the cheating tests, of which approximately 2 −m (1 − q) n−1 (1 − p) n N are calculations with correct input states. N thus must be chosen to be many times 2 m (1 − q) 1−n (1 − p) −n , so that the probability of the protocol yielding at least one calculation based on the correct input data is close to one.
Comments
The main point here is that general unconditionally secure multi-party computations can be carried out in principle. The protocol works essentially because no information can be obtained about the data at any stage of the calculation without affecting the quantum state in a way that at least one of the participants is likely to detect. It includes as important special cases one-and two-sided two-party computations, which are given by taking f 1 = 0 and f 1 = f 2 respectively.
As well as the theoretical interest in understanding this application of quantum information, there are obvious practical spin-offs. Secure multi-party computations have a wide variety of practical applications. For example, they can guarantee confidentiality in the exploration of shared dating preferences, [8] in testing the PIN number of a bank card against the bank's record, [3] and in automated auctions. [8] The present protocol is almost certainly far from optimal, by any reasonable criterion of efficiency. Even if technology permitted, no calculations of any complexity are likely to be carried out in practice using this protocol, since N will clearly be very large indeed for any serious calculation and the required bit commitments are also rather lengthy. It would be very interesting to develop protocols that are optimal, or more nearly optimal, for various classes of multi-party computation. Progress in this direction will be reported elsewhere. [9] Note that Clare plays no essential role in the protocol: her place can be taken by one of the participants, with loss of symmetry but not of security. It is perhaps also worth noting that, while the confidentiality of the outputs is guaranteed by the protocol, there is, of course, no way of guaranteeing that the participants will not share or pass on their input or output data -a possibility anyone taking part in a multi-party computation needs to consider.
